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Conflict in the Israeli 
Industrial Relations System 
A Critical Description 
Ran Chermesh 
The paper examines the Israeli industrial relations System at 
two levels: national and organizational. It utilizes Eldridge 's for-
mulation of Dunlop's (1958) concept of the industrial relations 
system. 
Few reports hâve been written on industrial relations Systems of coun-
tries outside North America. (For récent exceptions see; Howarth (1978); 
Jelin (1979); Luther (1979); and Picard (1978). The présent paper offers a 
critical description of the Israeli situation, with the aim of extending the set 
of explanatory variables and the range of empirical expérience available to 
those interested in the theory and practice of the subject. Qualitative 
methods, rather than statistical means, seem particularly appropriate for 
the purpose. But despite my préférence for an expositive approach, it seems 
essential to cite some figures. Table 1 présents some data about the Israeli 
economy and its pattern of industrial conflict. There were only eight hun-
dred and fifty thousand salaried workers in Israël in 1976, 85 percent of 
them members of the Histadrut (General Fédération of Labour). Almost 35 
percent work in public and community services and 27 percent in industry. 
Thèse branches, with the addition of the transportation enterprises, account 
for most strikes. Most industrial conflicts originate in public services and 
transportation. The former branch is underrepresented in the measure of 
strike frequency (F), but accounts for a disproportionate number of strikers 
(B) and man-days lost by strikes (MDI), (55.5 percent and 51.5 percent res-
pectively in 1974-19781). Most of the strike prone units are publicly owned 
and managed. The average strike in Israël involved 1,293 workers and lasted 
for 3 days. Strikes in public services involved more participants (2,586) and 
were slightly shorter (2.8 days). 
• CHERMESH, Ran, Department of Behavioral Sciences, Ben Gurion University of the 
Negev, Israël. 
î AH figures for the period 1974-8 include date for 1977. This information was excluded 
from Table 1. It is available at the source mentioned in Table 1 f.n. 4. Data in Table 1 are 
organized on the basis of pre- and post-élection year basis, and 1977, being an élection year, is 
excluded. 
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TABLK 1 
Israël (1974-8) — Descriptive figures 
Economie Branch 
Salariée!'2 
employées 
No. of Strikers(F) 
1974-63-4 19784 
No. of Strikers(B) 
1974-634 19784 
No. of Man-days 
Lost(MDl) 
1974-63-4 1978* 
A verage 
Duration (MDl/B) 
1974-6 1978 
A verage 
Size 
1974-6 
Slrike 
(B/F) 
1978 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Agriculture 
forestry and 
fishing 
1.9 
(16,250) 
1.0 
(1) 
2.4 
(2) 
0.0 
(70) 
0.5 
(1,099) 
0.1 
(194) 
0.5 
(5,639) 
2.8 5.1 70 550 
Industry (mining 
& manufacturing) 
27.0 
(230,800) 
28.6 
(30) 
24.7 
(21) 
7.6 
(6,475) 
4.3 
(9,556) 
18.0 
(31,531) 
6.8 
(72,714) 
4.9 7.6 216 455 
Electricity 
and Water 
1.3 
(11,100) 
1.0 
(1) 
2.4 
(2) 
1.5 
(1,257) 
0.2 
(409) 
0.9 
(1,612) 
0.1 
(1,362) 
1.3 3.3 1,257 205 
Construction 
(building and 
public works) 
7.7 
(65,800) 
1.0 
(1) 
2.4 
(2) 
0.0 
(50) 
1.3 
(3,000) 
0.4 
(661) 
0.6 
(6,075) 
13.2 2.0 50 1,500 
Commerce, res-
taurants & hôtels 
8.1 
(69,250) 
2.9 
(3) 
2.4 
(2) 
0.3 
(292) 
0.1 
(250) 
0.5 
(788) 
0.0 
(390) 
2.7 1.6 97 125 
Transportation 
storage and 
communication 
6.4 
(54,700) 
26.7 
(28) 
36.5 
(31) 
11.9 
(10,150) 
19.5 
(43,703) 
11.9 
(20,746) 
33.2 
(355,459) 
2.0 8.1 363 1,410 
Financing and 
business services 
7.5 
(64,100) 
4.8 
(5) 
4.7 
(4) 
12.9 
(11,057) 
4.6 
(10,320) 
11.5 
(20,176) 
1.0 
(10,320) 
1.8 1.0 2,211 2,580 
Public and com-
munity services 
34.7 
(296,600) 
30.5 
(32) 
20.0 
(17) 
53.4 
(45,616) 
69.1 
(155,112) 
47.5 
(82,928) 
57.0 
(610,637) 
1.8 3.9 1,426 9,124 
Personal and 
other services 
5.3 
(45,300) 
2.9 
(3) 
4.7 
(4) 
0.2 
(183) 
0.4 
(805) 
0.3 
(453) 
0.9 
(9,365) 
2.5 11.6 61 202 
Unclassificable 
( - ) 
1.0 
(1) (-) 
12.1 
(10,333) (-) 9.0 (15,757) (-) 1.5 — 10,331 — 
TOTAL 100.0 
(854,800) 
100.0 
(105) 
100.0 
(85) 
100.0 
(85,484) 
100.0 
(224,354) 
100.0 100.0 
(174,757)(1,071,961) 
2.0 4.8 821 2,639 
i Figures within columns do not add up to an exact total due to rounding. 
2 Source: Central Bureau of Statistics — Statistical Abstract of Israël, No. 28, 1977, Table XII/12, pp. 316-17. 
3 Figures are annual averages. The three-year period was chosen to represent the situation under Labour Party rule. 
4 Source: Department of Labour Relations — A Report on the Activities of the Department of Labor Relations and on Statistical Data Concerning 
Work Stoppages in 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979 (Hebrew). 
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We shall examine industrial relations Systems in Israël at two levels: na-
tional and organizational. Our analysis will be based on Eldridge's formula-
tion (1972, pp. 19-23) of J.E.T. Dunlop's (1958) concept of the industrial 
relations System. According to this formulation, a system of industrial rela-
tions involves two main components: the system itself and its environment. 
The system consists of actors (labor, management and specialist agencies), 
idéologies (each party's set of beliefs, interests and intentions vis-à-vis their 
own status and that of the other parties in the system), and rules (the system 
of norms which defines what behavior patterns can be expected and régu-
lâtes thèse behavior patterns). 
The environment of the industrial relations system includes the power 
and status relationships between groups that are not part of the system; the 
country's or organization's manufacturing technologies, and the markets in 
which the industrial relations system of the organization or country func-
tions. 
THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
Description 
ACTORS 
Three main participants interact in the Israeli industrial relations Sys-
tem: the Coordinating Body of Economie Organizations (CBEO), the 
Histadrut and the government. This tripartite composition, is traditional, 
but is structured in Israël in a unique way, which is determined mostly by 
the ownership sector. 
Almost 60% of ail salaried employées in Israël work in the private sec-
tor. Private managements are represented on the national level by the 
CBEO and the employées by the Histadrut. Médiation and judicial services 
however seldom they are needed at the national level, are provided by the 
Department of Labor Relations in the Ministry of Labor and Welfare and 
by the Labor courts. 
Almost 20% of wage-earners work in the public sector, whose main 
component is the government. Most other public employers, such as the 
Zionist-Movement or local authorities, tend to folio w the government's 
lead in industrial relations. This pattern places the Civil Service Commis-
sioner in a very influential position. The Israeli public sector is involved in 
both service and production functions. It employs workers in a wide variety 
of occupations, and maintains constant tension between standardization 
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and specialization, and hence provides fertile ground for labor disputes. 
Third party services are almost non-existant. The Department of Labor 
Relations consisting as it does of civil servants, is not empowered to enter 
into labor conflicts in the government sector. ' t a r d e r " methods, such as 
labor courts, are available, but since thèse courts are sovereign, to resort to 
them can be a risky venture. Thus, government prefers to back its employer 
function by législative authority, thereby arousing the ire of the trade 
unions. 
One out of every four wage-earners works in the Histadrut sector 
which is unique in that it is self-sufficient, acting in both management, 
union and third-party capacities. According to its socialist ideology exploi-
tation is ruled out by the very fact of class ownership of the means of pro-
duction. Every Histadrut member is automatically a member both of the 
Trade Union Division and of Hevrat Ha'Ovdim, the Histadrut holding 
company. Thus an employée of a Histadrut-owned plant is ideologically 
TABLE 2 
Main Actors and Employment by Ownership Sector 
National Level 
IR Actor Classification %of 
Ownership Salariée! 
Sector Management Union Third Party Workers1 
Private Coordinating Body General Fédération Government 59.8 
of Economie of Labor (Histadrut) — Labor 
Organizations — Trade Union Court, 
(CBEO) Division Department 
of Labor 
Relations 
Public Government — General Fédération Government 17.6 
Civil Service of Labor (Histadrut) — Labor 
Commission — Trade Union 
Division 
Court 
Histadrut General Fédération General Fédération General Fédé- 22.6 
of Labor (Histadrut) of Labor (Histadrut) ration of 
— Hevrat — Trade Union Labor 
Ha'Ovdim Division (Histadrut) 
— Trade 
Union 
Division 
î Source: BARKAY, H., The Public Sector, Histadrut Sector and Private Sector in the Israeli 
Economy, Jérusalem, The Falk Institute for Economie Research in Israël, 1968, 
Table 5, p. 35 (Hebrew). 
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defined as being a part owner of the plant. How therefore can he strike 
against himself? But since real life situations are more comphcated than 
ideological conceptualizations, collective bargaining has evolved in the 
Histadrut sector as well and the Trade Union Division has gained control 
over this area. 
As can be seen in Table 2 management, union and government interact 
therefore, in a comphcated pattern. Only private sector management opér-
âtes in a traditional fashion. Government functions both as third party and 
as management, and the Histadrut in ail three statuses, — management, 
union and third party. 
IDEOLOGY 
The accepted ideology of the system is based on a number of éléments: 
a préférence for job security as opposed to efficiency; récognition of the 
legitimate right of labor to organize which coexists with a critical attitude 
towards management's rights (or prérogative); tolérant attitude towards the 
discrepancy between policy déclarations and implementation; a tendency to 
seek pragmatic solutions rather than adhère to written procédures. 
The system of rules can be classified into those aimed at creating order 
in the industrial relations system itself, and those directed at ensuring the 
utilization of the manpower employed by the organization or country. The 
first group is concerned with defining the identity of the participants in the 
system, the rules of représentation, the method to be used in negotiations, 
etc. In this sphère the dominant ideology in Israël is voluntarism, according 
to which autonomous agreement by the principal participants is a precondi-
tion for législation. Thèse rules are characterized by strict adhérence to the 
principle of total independence vis-à-vis the government in ail matters 
relating to labor-management relations. The second group of norms is char-
acterized by linkage arrangements. Most wage scales are related and con-
stantly readjusted to one another. Thèse updating conventions are accepted 
normatively, even if seldom specified formally in collective contracts. Such 
interdependency enhances the rigidity of the system, and hence hinders any 
restructuring of the labor market. 
RULES 
The rule set at the national level of the Israeli IR encompasses laws and 
gênerai collective agreements. Fourteen principal labour laws exist in the 
légal code, which may be divided into four main catégories: 
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a) work conditions — Night Work in Bakeries (1951); Hours of Work and 
Rest (1951); Annual Holidays (1951) and Labour Inspection (1954). 
b) sensitive groups — Apprenticeship Law (1953); Youth Labour (1953); 
Employment of Women (1954); and Reserve Service (1952). 
c) social security — National Insurance (1953); Wage Protection (1958); 
and Severance Pay (1963). 
d) industrial relations — Seulement of Labour Disputes (1957); Collective 
Agreements (1957); and Employment Service (1959) (State of Israël, 
1968). 
The typical passage of a labor law starts with Histadrut initiative, fol-
lowed by negotiation and legitimization by the leading employers' associa-
tions; it is finally absorbed in the légal code and extended ail over the eco-
nomy by an act of législation. 
This process demonstrates the implications of the voluntaristic ideolo-
gy of the System and explains why législation is initiated or rejected in a cer-
tain sphère. The Histadrut was anxious to consolidate its social achieve-
ments and enforce them throughout the Israeli economy. The established 
employer associations were sometimes interested in and on occasion, indif-
fèrent to thèse targets. The extension of labor rights to the small ununion-
ized sector safeguarded organized private employers from unfair compéti-
tion. Labor dominated governments regarded approval of the main actors 
as a crucial prerequisite for any législative initiative. The sphère of indus-
trial relations is particularly sensitive, and prone to disagreement between 
the Histadrut and government. Hère, législation both came later and was 
meager in quantity. Issues such as the sanctity of the right to strike and 
compulsory arbitration are under constant discussion in government and 
parliamentary forums, but hâve seldom reached the ratification stage. Most 
problematic of ail is the définition of labor and management rights, repré-
sentation and functioning. Organizational terms such as union, worker-
committee, employer association hâve never been defined legally in a 
straight-forward and gênerai way. Such issues are left to autonomous défi-
nitions of the actors through their constitutions and tradition. 
The autonomous sets of rules of the industrial relations System at the 
national level are gênerai collective agreements. Such agreements are distin-
guished from spécifie collective agreements at the organization level by their 
coverage. They hâve nation-wide, industry-wide or area-wide validity, as 
compared to the spécifie unit applicability of the latter. The agreements are 
of two main types: the conventional labor contract which spécifies the terms 
of work of a wide category of workers; and a set of procédural norms which 
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regulate discipline (1967), dispute resolution (1957), labour relations (1967) 
and the joint council for productivity (1967). Thèse are typical examples of 
rules which may in due time be incorporated in législation, given the consent 
of the Histadrut and employer s' associations. Contract negotiations for a 
given category of workers are held by the delegates of management in a 
given sector and the représentatives of a national trade union. Intersectoral 
management committees are the exception to the rule. Union structure 
détermines the contracta jurisdiction. 
The unions affiliated to the Histadrut are both industrial, occupational 
and sector-based. In case of structural conflict, sectorial association on the 
one hand, and power considérations on the other hand, take precedence. 
Histadrut-owned industries hâve their own traditional reserved contract, 
which used to be superior to private sector agreements in terms of social 
benefits, and inferior from the point of view of wage levels. Public sector 
contracts, which once used to be negotiated by a gênerai union of civil ser-
vants, or by the gênerai union of clerks, are now bargained for by a multi-
plicity of occupational unions. 
General collective agreements of purely procédural nature are available 
only in the private sector. Analysis of their contents shows them to be a pro-
cédural reflection of the ideology of autonomy. The major actors in the na-
tional industrial relations level stipulate the rules of conduct for their lower 
level counterparts. An important step in this direction was the working 
code, which was agreed upon in 1962. This set of rules was aimed as a model 
for those establishments which had not developed their own code of service. 
A complementary set of norms deals with labor relations (1967) and im-
passe resolution (1957). The bilatéral interest of both management and the 
Histadrut in enhancing productivity was expressed in an agreement (1967) 
which defined the status of both sides, and called for the establishment of 
joint productivity councils and a detailed code for their opération. Such 
autonomous législation is rarer in the Histadrut-owned sector, where codifi-
cation initiative customarily either stems from individual économie concern 
or superimposed by the political échelon of the Histadrut. It is an even rarer 
phenomena in the public sector, where a conceptualization of a service code 
is preferred to explicit labor contract. 
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
An examination of the external factors which exert pressure on the in-
dustrial relations System in Israël shows the following picture: technology is 
a minor déterminant in most labour disputes. The Israeli economy encom-
passes few units with a high propensity to strike i.e. mines or ports. Since 
the main stage of its industrial development took place after statehood was 
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won in 1948, plants with outdated equipment are not common. The eco-
nomy has not thus far proved to be a very strong pressure-exerting factor in 
labor relations, despite the high rate of inflation and the obvious failure to 
achieve économie independence. 
The relatively weak impact of économie factors stems from the auto-
matic adjustments to price hikes (through automatic cost-of-living incré-
ments) and from a high degree of political sensitivity to the spectre of large 
— scale unemployment. Politics as a pressure — exerting factor, hâve thus 
far been the basic cause of both the stability and the rigidity of the industrial 
relations System on the national level. The political identity that existed un-
til 1977 between the country's ruling coalition and the leadership of the 
Histadrut made it easier for the system to establish and organize itself. 
Israël's récent political upheaval created the possibility of introducing 
changes in the System. The government has thus far proved unable to for-
mulate a clear-cut policy in the area of labor relations, but certain disrup-
tions now occur in the once-traditional dialogue between the government 
and the Histadrut. The system continues to function according to patterns 
that were acceptable in the past, but an increased feeling of aliénation and 
resentment is évident among the leaders of both the Histadrut and the Man-
ufacturer' Association (the leading component of the CBEO). 
PREVENTION OF LABOR DISPUTES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
The 1977 élection created a new situation in Israël. Since the two main 
political establishments of the country are now headed by the two largest 
rival parties. The right-wing Likud party heads the government and the 
socialist Labor party — The Histadrut. The latter has expressed its readi-
ness to cooperate with the government, but its collaboration is dépendent 
upon the former's acceptance of the traditional Israeli system. Any govern-
mental initiative to change the rules of the game is liable to face bitter oppo-
sition. The government can therefore choose between two diametrically-
opposed alternatives: modification of the présent system or rapid adapta-
tion to the system as it exists today. The former alternative would mean a 
short-range increase in the frequency and severity of labor disputes but 
could also lead, in the long run, to the development of a différent system, 
more suited to the political outlook of the party in power. Possible changes 
could include decentralization in the public sector, to be reflected in an in-
crease in the administrative responsibility of directors-generals of govern-
ment ministries and of their counter-parts in the private sector and in public 
corporations. Such decentralization could intensify the sensitivity of the 
labor relations system to the economy as a pressure-exerting factor. Reduc-
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tion in the size of the collective negotiating unit could lead to a lesser degree 
of linkage in the economy. It could also enhance the attractions of employ-
ment in sectors of the economy which are profitable or of high national 
priority. 
Routine negotiations between the leaders of the Histadrut and employ-
e r ' associations on the one hand and the country's political leaders are the 
second alternative. The adoption of a conciliatory approach toward the 
former could resuit in full exploitation of the potential of the présent Sys-
tem. Within the context of the dialogue, both sides could be asked to com-
mit themselves to industrial peace. They would thereby facilitate the evolve-
ment of a functional industrial relations System at the organization level, by 
removing obstacles to the development of constructive processes rather than 
by imposing régulations and procédures from outside. In the présent situa-
tion, however, it seems that the adoption of partial measures (such as com-
pulsory arbitration, wage freezes, etc.) could only resuit in greater unrest 
and in the failure of both government authority and private authority in this 
sensitive area. 
THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM 
AT THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL 
Description 
ACTORS 
The principal participants at this level are the managements of the 
various units and the représentatives of labor. Various specialists (e.g., 
labor court justices; labor relations officers; supervisors of employment of 
women, and youth; trade union officiais in labor councils; etc.) occupy a 
marginal rôle in most of the country's establishments. Their intervention is 
sporadic and usually takes place in crisis situations; furthermore, the extent 
of this intervention is dépendent on the degree to which both management 
and labor are willing to cooperate. 
Management in the prestate period (i.e., before 1948) consisted of three 
types of entrepreneurs: the institutional colonizer, the big private and the 
small private entrepreneur. There can be no doubt that "the most important 
single type... that developed in the Yishuv* was what may be called the "in-
stitutional entrepreneur colonizer" (Eisenstadt, 1969, p. 80). He was lo-
• Pre-State Jewish Community. 
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cated in public sector establishment, typically in Histadrut owned unit, and 
"his main concern was to maximize the scope of économie activities and the 
assets and profits of his own group and organization through the best mani-
pulation of both the market possibilities and the différent sources of capi-
tal, crédit, and so forth — especially from the différent colonizing agen-
cies" (Eisenstadt, 1969, p. 80). Such a manager regarded himself as the 
emissary of the collectivistic values of his society. The big private manager 
financed his activities mainly from his own private resources, but adopted a 
semi-public pattern of opération. He was strongly rooted in the conven-
tional value System and tended to imitate the working codes of the leading 
Histadrut économie élite. The third type, the small private entrepreneur, 
tended to be the conservative owner of a small-scale enterprise. 
The Israeli managerial group has undergone a process of convergence 
during the last thirty years. Their sources of recruitment hâve become simi-
lar — university graduâtes, mostly with technical and business school 
degrees, and retired senior and middle — rank army officers. Thèse execu-
tives lack the inner knowledge of the entrepreneur or the vétéran. Instead, 
they are characterized by professional and technical proficiency. Unfor-
tunately, they are only partially backed by those who hâve appointed them. 
The sole elected représentatives of ail employées in a given organization are 
Workers' Committees. Ail the workers, and not only the union members 
among them are their constituency. The fact that they are elected function-
aries détermines most of their characteristics. Their démographie profile, in 
the économie, educational or ethnie respect is similar to that of their rank 
and file; this similarity enhances the support of their public. Their political 
abilities are more salient than their formai knowledge of organizational, 
économie and légal matters. The nation-wide network of workers' commit-
tees has greater informai power than formai authority. Their national union 
or its local branch is their legally recognized représentative organization. 
This restriction on authority is aimed at furthering the overall policy, which 
is formulated by the national échelons of the Histadrut. Such a policy tends 
to underemphasize local needs, and to stress the achievement of political 
targets. Thus the contradiction between a political type and an économie 
type union crystalizes in the Israeli situation into a constant conflict be-
tween the national Trade Union Division of the Histadrut and the local 
workers' committees (Kerr et al. (1960); Friedman (1972)). Alienated from 
the contract negotiations arena, workers' committees in Israël concentrate 
their efforts on promotion, premium pay, and various plant administration 
issues. Thèse topics are prone to discrétion conflicts with the management. 
Formai workers' participation in management is quite rare in the Israeli 
economy. A participator policy was imposed on Histadrut owned units by 
the political organ, but without the commitment of the main actors on the 
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plant level they remain in a rudimentary state. Informai ''participation' ' ex-
ists in many establishments, but it indicates the relative powerlessness of 
management and the usurpation of its prérogatives by workers' représenta-
tion. Such a practice is both conducive to industrial conflicts and further 
appropriation of management rights. 
IDEOLOGY 
The traditional ideology at the organizational level treats every new 
benefit granted as a sacred right, irrespective of its source and motive. The 
local workers' committee is accepted as a senior partner at the administra-
tion level in ail matters concerning personnel. Attitudes towards manage-
ment vary widely. The management of a given enterprise is viewed as an im-
portant and functional body if it has succeeded in establishing its authority 
through drawing up operative plans, establishing orders of priority, and en-
suring its independence in various administrative matters, while, at the same 
time dictating its own terms for granting représentation to labor. In con-
trast, there are certain managements which are seen merely as the; focus of 
formai authority. They are useful only when the senior administrative level 
has to be persuaded of the validity of labor's demands, but may be disre-
garded altogether when pressures are applied. 
In many cases, a contract, whether gênerai or spécifie, is not regarded 
as the final, accepted formulation of privilèges and obligations. Both labor 
and management in certain places of employment prefer to regard a labor 
agreement as a framework, offering guidelines but leaving room for con-
tinuai negotiations. The degree to which formai régulations are applied at 
the organizational level varies according to the size and sectoral classifica-
tion of the particular place of employment. Déviations from procédures and 
régulations are very common and are customarily viewed as the best means 
of bridging the gap between the changing demands of reality and the inflexi-
bility of régulations. 
RULES 
It is customary to divide rules into two types: substantial and procé-
dural. While substantial rules vary from plant to plant and are heavily in-
fluenced by technological factors, procédural norms are somewhat more 
standardized. Hence, the présent report will focus on the later type. 
Procédural régulations are concerned with each of the main actors, i.e. 
management and local union, and with their pattern of interaction. While 
Israeli management resembles its counterparts in western countries, the 
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Israeli local union differs, and thus deserves spécial treatment. The Israeli 
shop steward is primarily a représentative of the people who elected him, 
i.e. ail workers in the unit he represents, and only secondarily a functionary 
of the Histadrut. He is a member of a team, consisting of the members of a 
workers' committee. According to the élection code of the Histadrut (Gen-
eral Fédération of Labor, 1978), the workers* committee is elected for a two 
years term by gênerai and secret élections. The chairman, or secretary, of 
the committee is elected by an indirect procédure, though traditionally the 
candidate who gained the largest number of votes in the gênerai élections 
wins. Thus, he is endowed with the legitimization needed for negotiating 
with management. The Histadrut cannot permit itself to grant too much lat-
itude to such grass roots leadership. Its populist base could undermine any 
effort to formulate a gênerai policy. Therefore, it's code stipulâtes the de-
grees of freedom of workers' committees. The first meeting of a new com-
mittee must be initiated by the local branch of the Histadrut, — the labor 
council. Ail its protocols and décisions must be filed in the councils records. 
The committee is not allowed to déclare a strike independently. Such an is-
sue must be approved by the appropriate Histadrut authority. The légal re-
présentative union is not the committee, but the Histadrut. Hence collective 
agreements are signed by an officiai of the trade union division of the 
Histadrut, and not by the chairman of the direct représentative délégation 
of the workers. Thus, the workers' committee is simultaneously an auto-
nomous and an administered body. Such duality is a constant source of 
frustration for the représentatives. Their négative sentiments are reflected in 
fréquent wild strikes2. 
The spécifie work contract is the main légal code of the individual 
enterprise. It is negotiated by the management of the appropriate unit and 
by the delegates of the trade union movement. Members of workers' com-
mittees play a secondary rôle in the process and their approval is not re-
quired. Today their power has increased and a corresponding increase in 
their involvement in the législative process has followed. The contacts be-
tween management and the workers' committee secretary are both fréquent 
and extensive. The approval of the committee is imperative in order to dis-
miss a worker who is on the permanent establishment. Its consent is regard-
ed as a precondition for ail matters except a few labor-relevant issues. Man-
agement refrains from granting spécial privilèges to a single worker, given 
2 Most strikes in Israël are unauthorized, i.e. wildeat strikes. Their percentage range for 
the years 1974-1978 is 60.4 to 73.1. Interestingly, the political upheaval caused no meaningful 
change in the situation. The percent of unauthorized strikes out of the total number is as fol-
lows: 1974 — 67.7; 1975 — 60.4; 1976 — 71.2; 1977 — 73.1; and 1978 — 67.1. In 1974-1976 
the Labour Party was in power, while 1978 was a year of Likud party rule in government and a 
Labour party majority in the Histadrut. 
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the threat of a favor extension demand by the committee. Almost total com-
pliance by the rank and file is normatively prescribed in Israeli organiza-
tions. Thus, the power position of the leadership is seldom challenged. 
Managements prefer to refrain from implementation, or even planning of 
organizational change without gaining the prior consent of the workers* 
secretary. This routine establishes informai participation of labor in man-
agement. This informality does not increase the power pool of the organiza-
tion, as claimed by the advocates of union-management coopération, but 
curtails managements initiative. Such a normative model is approximated 
in public enterprises, governmental as well as Histadrut-owned. It is less 
pronounced in privately-owned units, though even there management pré-
rogatives are heavily restricted. 
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Having depicted the System itself, let us examine the environment of 
the industrial relations Systems at the organizational level. The technologi-
cal standpoint cannot be discussed within the présent outline. Since there is 
a wide divergence between places of employment. The features of the éco-
nomie factor, as expressed in the distinction between a budget — based 
body and a market — based body, correspond to the features of the politi-
cal factor, i.e. the distinction between public and private ownership. The 
public sector is characterized by a high degree of centralization of authority 
beyond the organizational level, by a lax attitude to économie failure and by 
an inability to adhère to budgetary restrictions. 
PREVENTION OF LABOR DISPUTES AT THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL 
The intensity of labor disputes at the organizational level can be re-
duced if changes are introduced in any of the components of the industrial 
relations System. However, it would seem that the most effective way of 
bringing about such a réduction would be to introduce changes in the actor 
components of the System. Extensive training of members of workers' com-
mittees is being carried out, aimed at narrowing the knowledge gap between 
management and labor. Management*s weakness however, rather than the 
ignorance of officiais, is the most significant élément in the disfunctioning 
of the industrial relations System at the organizational level. The assigning 
of responsibility, together with the allocation of authority capable of deal-
ing with such responsibility, is an important prerequisite for change in the 
status of management at the local level. Reinforcement of managerial train-
ing in the field of labor relations, the consolidation of managements in-
CONFLICT IN THE ISRAËLI INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM. A CRITICAL DESCRIPTION 643 
dependence of labor, the development of a System for executive promotion 
and the ensuring of a relatively open job market for executives could be 
significant steps in raising management performance. Many organizations 
suffer from a fragmented structure as far as labor représentation is concern-
ed which could, under certain circumstances, serve as a convenient adminis-
trative tool for the differential treatment of various labor groups. In the 
Israeli context, a weak management often faces a fragmented labor repré-
sentation. In such cases, this segmentation does not permit the existence of 
an important process: the filtering of demands. If an organizational frame-
work were to be established above the level of workers' committees it could 
contribute to an improvement in labor relations at the organizational level. 
The development of such frameworks would necessitate the introduction of 
change in the Histadrut's structure. It would also call for more efficient dis-
tribution of functions among labor organizations classified by profession or 
by économie branch. 
CONCLUSION 
Table 1 supplies us with the rare opportunity to présent and evaluate an 
effort to modify the Israeli industrial relations System. The statistics for 
1978, the first calendar year of the new administration, indicate changes in 
three components of strike activity (Stern, 1978). The number of strikes 
decreased by 19 percent as compared to the pre-Likud period (1974-76). The 
length of the average strike more than doubled from two days to 4.8 days, 
and the average scope of strikes increased from 821 workers to 2,639. Thèse 
developments could be seen as indicating an evolving process of restructur-
ing of the System. The traditional Israeli strike pattern of numerous, short 
and medium-size events, does not lend itself to institutional régulation 
(Dunlop, 1976). This suggests that the emerging pattern of less numerous, 
longer and medium-size occurrences can better be controlled by such 
means. Such conclusions, however, are not borne out by the facts as pre-
sented by developments in the industrial relations field during 1979 and by 
Table 1. First, thèse developments were accompanied by a drastic increase 
in the number of man-days lost in strikes, from an average of 175,000 in the 
pre-Likud days to a figure of one million. Second, current developments in-
dicate that most of the characteristics described in this paper hâve not 
changed radically. The Histadrut continues to function as the principal fac-
tor in the national industrial relations System and neither the main ideologi-
cal doctrines nor the normative formulation has changed drastically. There-
fore, it seems likely that the industrial relation System on the plant level is 
the probable route of change, while the contribution of the actors at the na-
tional level should be restricted to enable such events to take place. 
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Conflits dans le système 
des relations professionnelles en Israël 
Une description critique 
L'article ci-dessus analyse le système des relations professionnelles en Israël au 
point de vue national et en tant qu'organisation. Il s'appuie sur l'exposé d'Eldridge 
(1972, pp. 19-23) tiré du concept des relations professionnelles de J.E.T. Dunlop 
(1958). Selon cet exposé, un S.R.P. comporte deux éléments principaux: le système 
lui-même et ce qui l'entoure. Le système comprend des acteurs, des idéologies, des 
règlements et l'environnement implique les rapports de pouvoir et de statut entre les 
groupes qui ne font pas partie du système ainsi que la technologie et l'économie. 
I. Le S.R.P. au niveau national 
Les principaux participants au niveau national sont la Commission de coordina-
tion des organisations économiques, la Fédération générale du travail (Histadrut) et 
le gouvernement. Les relations entre ces organismes varient selon la nature de la pro-
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priété des secteurs de l'économie. Presque 60 pour cent des salariés en Israël appar-
tiennent aux unités du secteur privé, 18 pour cent se trouvent dans les entreprises 
publiques et le reste (23 pour cent) relève des établissements de PHistadrut. C'est la 
fonction de la CCD.E. de représenter le secteur privé. La Commission de la fonc-
tion publique représente le secteur public et la Hevrat Ha'Ovdim, société de gestion 
de l'Histadrut, représente celle-ci. La Chambre des syndicats est le principal repré-
sentant de ceux-ci dans les trois secteurs de négociation. Les tribunaux du travail 
sont aussi des acteurs importants tant dans le secteur privé que dans le secteur public. 
Le Service des relations industrielles du ministère du Travail et du Bien-être social est 
un participant actif dans le secteur privé, mais il n'est pas impliqué dans le secteur 
gouvernemental (ce qui est le principal employeur du secteur public). La Chambre 
des syndicats remplit les fonctions d'une tierce partie dans le secteur de l'Histadrut. 
Ainsi, dans le secteur privé, le D.R.P. correspond au système qu'on retrouve dans le 
monde occidental; le secteur de l'Histadrut en est un qui est autonome et se suffit à 
lui-même; le secteur public est un modèle mixte d'un S.R.P. 
L'idéologie courante du système se fonde sur la sécurité d'emploi, la légitimité 
du syndicalisme, le rejet des prérogatives patronales et une approche pragmatique en 
matière de griefs et de différents. Le système est de type volontariste. 
L'ensemble des règlements au niveau national comprend à la fois des lois et des 
conventions collectives générales. Des quatorze principales lois, quatre traitent de 
conditions de travail proprement dites; quatre, des questions de sécurité sociale; 
trois, de la réglementation du système de relations professionnelles. L'adoption typi-
que d'une loi suit le cheminement suivant: l'Histadrut en prend d'abord l'initiative; 
les principales associations d'employeurs viennent à les accepter par voie de négocia-
tion; finalement, elle est insérée dans le code par la législation et elle s'applique alors 
à la totalité de l'économie israélienne. 
Les conventions collectives générales sont de deux types: les contrats de travail 
ordinaires qui spécifient les conditions d'emploi pour une catégorie considérable de 
salariés et un ensemble de normes qui traitent des questions de discipline, des règle-
ments de différends, de l'amélioration des relations de travail et de la productivité. 
Le moment venu, celles-ci peuvent être insérées dans la législation. 
La contrainte technologique est de peu d'importance dans les relations de travail 
au niveau national. Quant aux problèmes économiques, ils sont plutôt du ressort de 
la politique. En dépit d'une inflation élevée et persistante ainsi que de l'incapacité 
manifeste d'Israël d'atteindre à son indépendance économique, une bonne partie de 
la pression qui aurait pu venir de ce côté a été absorbée par l'existence d'un régime 
universel d'indexation du coût de la vie et l'application de mesures préventives contre 
le chômage. Des facteurs politiques peuvent être considérés comme les causes fonda-
mentales de la stabilité et de la grande rigidité du système de relations professionnel-
les en Israël. L'agitation politique qui porta au pouvoir le parti Lizzud et qui rejeta le 
parti travailliste dans l'opposition après 46 ans de gouvernement aurait pu être le 
signal de changement et de rénovation, mais la faillite économique et sociale du nou-
veau gouvernement en empêcha toute réalisation. 
II. Le S.R.P. en tant qu'organisation 
Les principaux acteurs du S.R.P. en Israël sont les dirigeants d'entreprises et les 
représentants du travail, c'est-à-dire les comités de travailleurs. Le groupe des diri-
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géants d'entreprises du secteur privé comprend trois types principaux: le colonisa-
teur, le dirigeant d'une grande entreprise et le petit entrepreneur privé (Eisenstadt, 
1969, p. 80). Cependant, ce groupe a subi des changements durant les trente derniè-
res années. Aujourd'hui, les principales sources de recrutement sont les diplômés 
d'universités et les militaires à la retraite de haut et moyen grades. S'ils ont tendance 
à manquer du savoir inné de l'entrepreneur et du vétéran, ils se caractérisent par leur 
compétence technique et professionnelle. 
Au niveau de l'organisation, les représentants des salariés sont les membres des 
comités de travailleurs. Ils sont élus par l'ensemble des salariés de l'unité à laquelle ils 
appartiennent et non par les seuls membres des syndicats. Leur connaissance techni-
que des politiques de l'entreprise est plus apparente que la connaissance réelle de 
l'organisation et des problèmes économiques et légaux. Le représentant légal des 
salariés dans une unité donnée est l'Histadrut et non pas le comité des travailleurs. 
Ainsi, dans la situation qui existe en Israël, il y a opposition entre un type de syndicat 
politique et un type de syndicat économique, ce qui se concrétise par un conflit cons-
tant entre la Chambre syndicale de l'Histadrut et les comités locaux de travailleurs. 
Ces derniers sont évincés des négociations collectives et, en conséquence, ils consa-
crent leurs efforts aux questions de promotion, de prime et autres sujets connexes à 
l'administration de l'entreprise. Ils ont aussi tendance à usurper les prérogatives de la 
direction et à s'engager dans une participation semi-officielle à la gestion. 
Les syndicalistes jouent un rôle marginal dans la plupart des établissements du 
pays. Leur intervention est sporadique. Ils s'entremettent dans les situations de crise 
et lorsque la direction et les travailleurs sont d'accord. 
Au plan de l'organisation, l'idéologie traditionnelle considère tout nouvel avan-
tage acquis comme un droit sacré. Le comité local de travailleurs est accepté comme 
un partenaire important dans toutes les matières qui ont trait au personnel. Les com-
portements à l'endroit de la direction varient beaucoup et sont surtout caractérisés 
par le respect que valent aux travailleurs du rang et à leurs dirigeants les efforts et les 
réalisations de la direction. 
Les règlements varient beaucoup selon le type de l'organisation, mais cet article 
ne traite que des procédés de fonctionnement qui concernent chacun des principaux 
acteurs et des relations qu'ils ont entre eux. Si la fonction de dirigeant d'entreprise se 
rapproche de ce qui existe dans les pays occidentaux, le type de syndicat diffère beau-
coup et il exige qu'on y porte attention. Le délégué syndical fait partie d'une équipe 
et représente le comité des travailleurs. Il est choisi pour un terme de deux ans à l'oc-
casion d'élections générales. Le président du comité, ou le secrétaire est élu au moyen 
d'un mécanisme indirect, même si, traditionnellement, le candidat qui obtient le plus 
de suffrages remporte l'élection. L'Histadrut essaie d'influencer le comité en lui im-
posant un code de surveillance. En conséquence, le comité des travailleurs est quand 
même un organisme autonome et régi. Une telle dualité est une source de frustration 
pour les représentants, ce qui se traduit par de fréquentes grèves sauvages. 
Le contrat de travail spécifique est le code principal de l'entreprise individuel-
lement. Il est négocié par les deux organismes représentatifs et les travailleurs ont 
rarement voix au chapitre. 
Au niveau de l'organisation, la contrainte externe courante et principale est le 
facteur politique. Le secteur public est caractérisé par une grande centralisation de 
l'autorité, par une attitude de laisser-aller devant la non-réussite économique et 
l'inaptitude à se soumettre à des restrictions budgétaires. Le secteur privé tient 
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davantage compte des exigences du marché, même si on y préfère l'appui et la pro-
tection du gouvernement à la concurrence des lois du marché. 
Conclusion 
Les données du premier tableau présentent une comparaison des statistiques 
relatives aux grèves avant et après les élections générales de 1977. Les trois compo-
santes de l'appréciation des grèves ont changé. Le nombre de grèves a diminué; elles 
sont devenues plus longues; elles touchent un plus grand nombre de salariés, mais 
une telle constatation ne permet pas de conclure à un changement radical dans les 
principales caractéristiques du système des relations professionnelles qui est décrit 
dans le présent article. L'agitation politique au niveau macrosocial n'a apporté 
aucun changement important dans la législation. 
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